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Mergers are common practice in many markets and their dynamics, as well as their advantages
and disadvantages, are often discussed. Especially the analysis of horizontal mergers and their
possible eﬃciency gains have been important topics in recent years (European Commission
Report [5]). Economic merger theory shows that a merger can reduce welfare by increasing
market power but that it can also create eﬃciency gains in a variety of ways, thereby making
the merger possibly welfare enhancing (see Röller et al. [15] for an overview).
However, many analysts suspect that there are more factors in play. Eﬃciency gains of
mergers should not be taken for granted. The possibility that a merged ﬁrm may become
more eﬃcient does not mean that these gains will be actually realised as is now widely assumed
in the economics literature. This is because of two related factors. First, becoming more
eﬃcient requires investment and is thus a strategic decision. Second, a newly merged ﬁrm
brings together diﬀerent corporate cultures, which can lead to conﬂict and therefore possibly
less investment.1
This paper broadens the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains in concentrated
markets. In line with Rajan & Zingales [13], we think it is realistic to claim that the manager
and not the owner is in control of many decisions that aﬀect a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency.2 The aim is
to shed more light on how merger and investment decisions interact, and look how the internal
organization of ﬁrms has an inﬂuence on these interactions. This approach facilitates the
understanding of why some mergers may fail to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen.
We construct a model of endogenous mergers with three managers. Managers choose whom
to form partnerships while anticipating a share of the future revenues. Each manager controls
some non-transferable resources, such as organizational or managerial capacities, that determine
production costs. They have to decide whether to supply them (invest)a tap r i v a t ec o s tb e f o r e
the formed ﬁrms compete in the product market à la Cournot. We assume that when managers
are together, the resources of the new formed ﬁrm add up the resources that the participating
1A recent example can be found in the creation of Corus in 1999. The Anglo-Dutch group became the third-
biggest steel company in the world, but its value has dramatically come down. The Economist (March 15th 2003)
argues that the error was that Corus “failed to construct a workable model for its internal management, choosing
instead to paper over the diﬀerences between the English and the Dutch systems.”
2Rajan & Zingales [13] say that the amount of surplus that a manager gets from the control of residual rights
is often more contingent on him making the right speciﬁc investment than the surplus that comes from ownership.
Hence, access to the resources of the ﬁrm can be a better mechanism to describe power than ownership. Of
course the agent who owns and uses the assets of the ﬁrm can be the same person.
2managers control.3 This allows us to take into account economies of scale.4
Currently all discussions on mergers are limited to exogenous eﬃciencies while the outcomes
and policy recommendations could be diﬀerent when considering investment in a more eﬃcient
technology as a choice variable. In a study for the European Commission, Röller et al. [16]
lament the lack of economic knowledge about the interaction of merger and investment decisions:
“It is not clear how one should treat the endogenous scale economies that are an alienable aspect
of concentrated industries”.
Forging a common corporate culture out of two or more disparate ones can be costly and
c a ne v e nl e a dt ol e s se ﬃcient and less proﬁtable ﬁrms. Surprisingly enough, concepts such as
power and conﬂict within the ﬁrm are often forgotten in the economics literature when looking
at merger decisions, despite evidence indicating that they play a major role (Seabright [18]).
We consider the possibility that, after a merger, managers do not work in the interest of the
ﬁrm but in their own.5 It is often said that the motivation of managers to work together in the
interest of the ﬁrm comes from team spirit and trust in each other (Kandel & Lazear [11]). But,
this is exactly what we believe is lacking in a merged ﬁrm. Since it is not always possible to
write complete contracts in a ﬁrm and the privately costly investment is ex ante not veriﬁable,
t h el a c ko ft r u s ti sl e a d i n gt oaf r e er i d i n gp r o b l e m . T h u s ,c o n ﬂict in our model makes that each
manager in a ﬁrm invests only when it is privately beneﬁcial to do so. Internal problems may
therefore arise, driven by a lack of trust and informational externalities caused by the inability
to identify individual contributions (Holmström [9]).
Two extreme cases are considered. First, we analyse the situation where managers coop-
e r a t ei n s i d et h eﬁrm when deciding on investment. Equivalently, contracts are assumed to be
complete. This setup permits us to investigate what happens when investment is a decision
variable and allows us to compare with the realised eﬃciency gains when managers do not co-
3This argument is valid for all cases where the resources are complementary. The same idea is found in Bloch
[2] Goyal & Moraga-González [7], where eﬀorts in R&D induce a higher spillover if ﬁrms are in a joint venture.
4A recent literature on endogenous coalition formation deals with eﬃciency gains (e.g. Belleﬂamme [1], Bloch
[2] and Yi [19]), but also these authors model eﬃciency gains as exogenous. Yi [20] lets ﬁrms decide on their
investment in R&D, but the level of product market collusion is determined by a social planner.
5All managers in our model stay in the merged ﬁrm and keep control over part of the assets. One could claim
that in a merger only one manager comes to control all the assets. But this would eliminate all internal problems
and is normally not observed in reality. Probably it would be better to model a merger not as a conﬂict between
single managers, but as a lack of trust between the diﬀerent teams that now have to work together. We think
that our way of modelling is a good approximation of this idea, assuming that each manager is the boss of his
team and making all strategic decisions.
3operate within the ﬁrm. It is found that if managers inside a ﬁrm cooperate, they have more
i n c e n t i v e st od os oi nam e r g e dﬁrm because of potential economies of scale, but only when it is
proﬁtable. In other words, even when there is no internal conﬂict, a potential merger may not
necessarily be more eﬃcient. The second scenario considers a situation where the managers do
not trust each other. Contracts are not complete and suboptimal investment decisions are likely
to occur (Holmström [8]). We ﬁnd that the conﬂict of interests within the ﬁrm can dominate
the possible economies of scale, making a larger merged ﬁrm invest less. A merger can therefore
even be a less eﬃcient ﬁrm than non-merged ﬁrms.6
These equilibrium investment decisions have an impact on the stability of industry structures.
When looking at which mergers will eﬀectively materialise, we ﬁnd for cooperating managers
inside the ﬁrm a result in the spirit of Salant et al. [17]. If all managers simultaneously can
choose to go to the monopoly industry structure, they will do so. This is possible with our merger
stability concept in which managers can anticipate the reaction of the others. Thus, when
managers cooperate at the investment-decision level, the only stable structure is the monopoly.
This complete market concentration does not necessarily lead to a more eﬃcient production.
For non-cooperating managers, not only the monopoly structure but the duopoly and triopoly
are possible stable outcomes. Two conclusions follow. First, conﬂict within the ﬁrm can lead
to less market concentration, even when modelling mergers as the potentially more eﬃcient
ﬁrms. This is the case when duopoly or triopoly are stable, whereas without conﬂict the
monopoly was always stable. Second, when there will indeed be mergers in equilibrium, these
merged ﬁrms are sometimes to be found less eﬃcient. This happens when -despite the internal
conﬂict- it is optimal to merge, but -because of more internal conﬂict and aggressive investment
of competitors- managers invest less in the larger merged ﬁrms.
Welfare analysis shows that the stable industry structure is too concentrated from a social
point of view for both scenarios when merged ﬁrms do not become more eﬃcient. A welfare
comparison of the stable structures in the no-conﬂict and conﬂict situation indicates that the
6The set-up of the model and sequence of events is in the same philosophy as Espinosa & Macho-Stadler [6],
Rajan & Zingales [13] and Goyal & Moraga-González [7]. In Espinosa and Macho-Stadler [6], partners group into
ﬁrms in a sequential way, and in the second stage ﬁrms compete à la Cournot with a moral hazard problem inside
the ﬁrms when deciding upon production. In Rajan & Zingales [13], an asset owner chooses how many managers
can have access to the assets. The managers who receive access choose their non-contractible investment. In
Goyal & Moraga-González [7], ﬁrms decide to participate in R&D networks. Given a collaboration network,
each ﬁrm chooses a non-contractible investment which deﬁnes the cost of production and all ﬁrms individually
compete à la Cournot afterwards.
4scenario where managers do not trust each other is always equal or inferior to the case where
managers cooperate internally. The cases where the non-cooperating managers do not merge,
-leading to less market power and thus better for consumers- are dominated by the loss in
eﬃciency, which is worse for consumers.
These results show that interactions between what is happening inside and outside ﬁrms is
important in determining the boundaries and eﬃciency levels of a ﬁrm. A regulator should take
into account that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger may not be realised, what could change
the decision for approval of this merger as we see when analysing social welfare. Possibly there
has to be given also more attention to lack of trust within ﬁrms. Our model suggests that
internal conﬂict not only harms ﬁrms, but also consumers and therefore total welfare. We give
as well an explanation for merger failures. When ﬁrms decide to go together, the organisational
diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If managers do not correctly foresee the
internal problems, the new ﬁrm may not be proﬁtable and thus resulting in a failue.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present
the solution of the diﬀerent stages of the model. Section 6 and section 7 discuss respectively
welfare issues and some extensions of the model. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
We consider a situation where three managers have to decide on their productive organisation.
In a ﬁrst stage, managers decide on the industry structure (Ω) and choose whether to set up
their own ﬁrm or join forces with other managers. Three industry structures can arise. We
denote each manager in a monopoly as m and in a triopoly as t. In the duopoly structure, the
two managers that merge are denoted by i (‘insider’) whereas the remaining manager is denoted
as o (‘outsider’). In the second stage, each manager decides to which extent he invests -at a
cost- to reduce production costs. In the ﬁrst scenario, there is no internal conﬂict within a ﬁrm.
Equivalently, all decisions are veriﬁable and managers behave in the interest of the ﬁrm to which
they belong. In the second case, their is no control on which managers invest and because of
a lack of trust managers do what is best for them individually. In the third stage the formed
ﬁrms compete à la Cournot.7
7It is in the interest of all the managers in the same ﬁrm to cooperate in the product market. This is because
we do not assume that there is an individual cost attached to producing. For a partnership formation model
where production is costly for each manager, see Espinosa & Macho-Stadler [6].
5To solve the model we proceed by backward induction. We ﬁrst solve the third stage of the
game, where ﬁrms simultaneously decide their production level. We consider an homogeneous
market with a linear demand, P(Q)=a − Q,w h e r ea is a positive constant measuring the size
of the market and Q =
P
ω∈Ω
qω is the total production, with qω the production of ﬁrm w.
Anticipating the Nash equilibrium in outputs, managers take investment decisions simulta-
neously. The constant marginal cost of ﬁrm ω, ω ∈ Ω, will be denoted by sω, and consists in
common marginal cost, S, reduced by the investment of the managers within each ﬁrm:




where Ij represents investment by manager j in ﬁrm ω. The more managers in the ﬁrm, the
more possibility to lower the costs of production, so there are possibilities for economies of scale
in investment. Manager j chooses Ij in the set {0,k}. Parameter k can be interpreted as the
magnitude that investment brings in lowering the production costs of the ﬁrm.8 We assume that
in equilibrium all ﬁrms in all industry structures produce a non-negative quantity and therefore
k ∈ [0, a−S
2 ]. The cost of an investment Ij is denoted by Cj (Ij),w h e r eCj (0) = 0 and Cj (k)=c.
In the ﬁrst stage, the merger stage, managers decide on forming a ﬁrm alone or together
with other managers. We assume ﬁrstly that mangers share proﬁts equally, and discuss later
that the results would not change qualitatively if they decide on the sharing rule. An industry
structure is stable if no manager or group of managers has an incentive to deviate and form a
diﬀerent ﬁrm. The payoﬀ of the formed ﬁrm depends on the organisation of the other managers.
Hence, in evaluating a possible deviation, managers must make a prediction of what the other
managers will do. We adopt the view that the most reasonable prediction when deciding upon
a deviation is that the remaining managers will choose the best strategy possible.
Deﬁnition 1 An industry structure Ω is stable if there is no proﬁtable deviation by a group of
managers to form another ﬁrm, considering that the remaining managers would choose to form
ﬁrms to maximise their payoﬀ.
This analysis is relatively simple when considering three managers. When the group con-
sidering a deviation is the three-managers ﬁr m ,w eo n l yh a v et oc h e c ki ft h i si sap r o ﬁtable
8Note that an alternative approach is to assume that the investment belongs to an interval [0,k]. Given
the linearity of the model, this would be equivalent to the assumption I ∈ {0,k} since the optimal decision on
investment is always a corner solution.
6deviation since there are no remaining managers. When two managers deviate, the optimal re-
action by the third manager is trivially to stay alone. Finally, when only one manager deviates,
the remaining two may choose optimally either to go together or to split apart.
When considering a deviation, managers are anticipating the investment outcome in the sec-
ond stage. When there are multiple Nash equilibria in the investment stage, they have to make a
prediction about what will occur as investment outcome. We adopt the view that managers are
optimistic: when considering a deviation, they predict the investment Nash equilibrium which
is most beneﬁcial in terms of proﬁts.9
3 Product market competition (3rd Stage)
Assume that an industry structure Ω with r ﬁrms has been formed at stage 1 and the investments








































4 Endogenous Investment (2nd stage)
In this section we analyse the investment decision for managers as a function of the market
structure and the internal commitment. Let us ﬁrst set the terminology we use. One of
9This approach has been used by other authors. Diamantoudi [4] analyses the endogenous formation of
coalitions using the concept of ‘binding agreements’ when there are multiple Nash equilibria and considers diﬀerent
behavioral assumptions, among others the optimistic approach. A similar concept for matching markets has been
deﬁned by Demange & Gale [3]. The optimistic view is very demanding in terms of stability since it may induce
many deviations. However, in our model with three managers, stability is reached for almost all parameter
combinations and this stability concept reduces the number of stable outcomes and allows us to concentrate on
‘very’ stable industry outcomes.
7the main aims of the paper is to investigate whether a merger leads to more eﬃciency.W e
say that there are eﬃciency gains when a merged ﬁrm produces at a lower marginal cost than
would separate entities do. This lowering in marginal costs is due to a higher investment of the
managers present in the ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition 2 A merger implies eﬃciency gains when the merged ﬁrm has lower production
costs. These lower production costs are realised because of a higher investment activity of the
managers in the merged ﬁrm.
We consider two extreme cases of internal organisation. First, we discuss the scenario where
managers cooperate fully within the ﬁrm. This results in the best possible situation for the
managers (ﬁrst best situation). Second, the internal conﬂict case is looked at.
4.1 No Internal Conﬂict
If investment is a cooperative decision within the ﬁrm, the proﬁt for a manager j in ﬁrm ω ∈ Ω










Cl .( 3 )
Note that maximizing (3) is equivalent to maximizing the (net) proﬁts of the ﬁrm. Investment
of diﬀerent ﬁrms must form a Nash equilibrium.
It is intuitive enough that costs and gains of investment play a major role in what happens
in equilibrium and our analysis is done in function of these two parameters. But apart from
costs and gains, the amount in which ﬁrms will decide to reduce production costs depends (i) on
t h es i z eo ft h eﬁrms, i.e. the number of managers in the ﬁrm, and (ii), on the competition level.
First, the larger a ﬁrm is, the more incentives to invest. Since managers in the same ﬁrm are
cooperating, they will be able to exploit the economies of scale. Second, a ﬁrm may want to
invest for strategic reasons. Investment activities are strategic substitutes across ﬁrms and more
investment implies later on a better position in the production phase vis à vis the competitors.
Therefore, the more competitors in the market, the more incentives a manager has to invest.
This means that the scale eﬀect and strategic eﬀect go in opposite directions.10 Proposition
10This is of course an immediate consequence of our model. The number of managers in the market is ﬁxed,
so if there are more managers inside the ﬁrm -i.e. the ﬁrm is larger- there are less managers outside the ﬁrm -ie.
there are less competitors. However, it seems natural to assume that, given a certain industry, larger ﬁrms and
a more concentrated market go together, even if there would be free entry.
81 states the previous intuition as a function of the parameters of the model. Remark that we
state the eﬃciency gains in the conditional state. At this stage we do not know yet which
mergers are going to take place if any.
Proposition 1 When managers cooperate, for costs/gains of investment going from low to
high, we can distinguish four regions:
(A) All managers invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(B) Managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly invest, but single-manager ﬁrms may
not. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(C) Managers that set up a ﬁrm alone do not invest. Either the monopolists or the insiders
invest. There exist therefore always a merger that would lead to eﬃciency gains, but not any
m e r g e rw o u l dl e a dt oa ne ﬃciency gain.
(D) Nobody invests. No merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
The regions deﬁned in Proposition 1 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted
in Figure 1.11 When the investment is free (i.e., c =0 ) ,a n yﬁrm will invest in reducing
production costs (region A). On the contrary, when the investment is extremely expensive as
compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal decision will be not to invest (region D).
For intermediate ranges of costs/gains of investment, the scale and strategic issues determine who
invests. Region B shows that the ﬁrst managers to give up investing are the one-manager ﬁrms,
because the scale event is strongest: the smallest ﬁrms loose ﬁrst their incentives. In region
C, both eﬀects can dominate. In region C1, only monopolists invest because the scale eﬀect
dominates. In region C2, the strategic motive is more important and the insiders (competing
in the duopoly) invest whereas the monopolists do not. Note that still, within the duopoly,
t h ei n s i d e r sh a v em o r ei n c e n t i v e st oi n v e s tt h a nt h eo u t s i d e rb e c a u s eo ft h es c a l ee ﬀect. In our
model the strategic eﬀects are almost always inferior to the scale eﬀects when there is no internal
conﬂict.
Multiple investment equilibria may exist. The optimal decision for a monopoly and duopoly
is always unique. In the triopoly the type of equilibrium is unique but it is not always clear
which manager invests in equilibrium. There are three equilibria of the type ((k)(k)(0)) where
two managers invest, I = k, and the third does not. In another region of the parameters there
11Note that the normalisation a − S =1implies that k ∈ [0,1/2] in order to have all ﬁrms producing in
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Figure 1: Investment Nash Equilibria when 
               there is no internal conflict exist three Nash equilibria where the investment decisions take the form ((k)(0)(0)). This is
because managers are ex-ante symmetric and we cannot say who invests and who not. This is
not important in the investment stage, since we only need to know what happens in equilibrium,
independent on which person does what.
4.2 Internal Conﬂict
We now solve the situation where managers within the ﬁrm do not cooperate when taking
investment decisions. Managers choose again their investment as a function of the gains this
investment implies for the proﬁts of the ﬁr mt ow h i c ht h e yb e l o n g . B u tt h ec o s to fi n v e s t i n gi s
not shared by the whole ﬁrm, the managers individually have to bear this cost and a free riding





Πω − Cj .( 4 )
As in the ﬁr s tb e s tc a s e ,t h ea m o u n ti nw h i c hﬁrms decide to reduce production costs depends
(i) on the size of the ﬁrms and (ii), on the competition structure. However, the issues are not
as clear cut anymore. If a ﬁrm is larger, there are still more chances to exploit the economies
of scale. But also the possibility for internal conﬂict grows. In a larger ﬁrm each manager
receives a smaller share of the gross proﬁts induced by his individually costly investment. The
eﬀect of the size of a ﬁrm on the incentives to invest can go both ways. Whereas for low costs
with respect to gains of investment economies of scale dominates, conﬂict becomes rapidly more
important as costs/gains rise. Thus, managers in larger ﬁrms loose much faster their incentives
to invest than in the case without conﬂict. The strategic event still induces managers in a less
concentrated market to invest more. It is therefore easy to understand that both the conﬂict
and strategic eﬀect go in the same direction. When conﬂict is strong, managers in smaller
ﬁrms -and therefore also facing more competitors- have more incentives to invest. Proposition
2 states the previous intuition as a function of the parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 When managers do not cooperate inside the ﬁrm, for costs/gains of investment
going from low to high, we can distinguish four regions:
(E) Managers in a monopoly and insiders invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(F) Managers in a monopoly never invest and there is always an equilibrium in which insiders
invest. In the equilibrium where insiders invest, a merger towards duopoly would imply eﬃciency
gains. A merger towards monopoly would mean an eﬃciency loss.
10( G )M a n a g e r si nt h em o n o p o l ya n di n s i d e r sn e v e ri n v e s t ,b u tt h e r ee x i s t sa l w a y sas i n g l e -
manager ﬁrm that does. Any merger would imply eﬃciency losses.
(H) Nobody invests. No merger leads to eﬃciency gains or eﬃciency losses.
The regions deﬁned in Proposition 2 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted in
Figure 2. In region E where the investment is close to free, any ﬁrm invests. Within this region
conﬂict is not important, and the scale eﬀect dominates, implying that the largest ﬁrms in the
market have most incentives to invest. For costs/gains of investment rising, the conﬂict issue,
reinforced by the strategic eﬀect, starts interfering with scale and managers in the monopoly stop
investing (region F1). Further on, the conﬂict situation becomes more and more important,
making either the insiders or the outsider in duopoly invest (region F2). The conﬂict eﬀect
becomes ﬁnally always dominant and insiders never invest anymore (region G). Finally, when
the investment is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal
decision for all managers will be not to invest (region H).
What does this imply for the eﬃciency gains? As long as the monopolist invests, any merger
leads to a more eﬃcient ﬁrm. From the moment that managers in the monopoly do not invest
and other managers still do, a merger towards monopoly leads to eﬃciency losses.W h e n a l s o
the insiders stop investing and the one-manager ﬁrm still does, any merger leads to eﬃciency
losses. Finally, when nobody invests, a merger does not lead to any eﬃciency changes.
Summarising the results obtained for both scenarios, some mergers may induce eﬃciency
gains but for this to be true a necessary condition is that the cost of the investment compared
to the gains are low enough. If the internal conﬂict is important, a merger may even imply
eﬃciency losses.
5 Stable market structures (1st stage)
Managers decide in the ﬁrst stage to stay alone or go together with other managers, anticipat-
ing the investment decisions and competition in the market. We analyse the stable industry
structures. We consider ﬁrst the situation with no internal conﬂict.
5.1 No Internal Conﬂict
When managers cooperate within the ﬁrms, larger ﬁrms tend to invest more and tend to be
more proﬁtable. This makes it naturally more interesting for managers to merge. The next










Figure 2: Investment Nash Equilibria when 
               there is internal conflict Proposition 3 When there is no internal conﬂict within ﬁrms, the monopoly is the only stable
structure. No stable structure exists for a region where costs and gains of investment are very
low.
The results stated in Proposition 3 are represented in Figure 3.T w o d i ﬀerent processes
lead the monopoly to be the only stable outcome. The ﬁrst takes place because managers are
able to avoid the classical outsider-problem. If a managers tries to free-ride on the others by
deviating, the other two optimally split apart, making the deviation unproﬁtable.12 The other
process leads managers very naturally towards the monopoly outcome, because any merger is
proﬁtable for all managers.
When the cost of investment is high with respect to its gains (region D in the corresponding
Figure 1), managers do not invest and the only motive for merging is having more market
power. Managers reach thus the monopoly through the ﬁrst process. However, when the
cost of investment is low with respect to its gains (region A), managers always prefer to invest
because of economies of scale. Merged entities have therefore lower production costs, leading in
general to more incentives to merge than when nobody invests. This situation is similar to the
situation described in Perry & Porter [12], where the merged ﬁrm has lower production costs
than either of the forming ﬁrms.13 In regions B and C, either the ﬁrst or the second process
makes the monopoly the only stable outcome.
5.2 Internal Conﬂict
We present the stable mergers when conﬂict within ﬁrms happens. For the sake of presentation,
we show the results separately for the four regions identiﬁed in Proposition 2.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst
the case corresponding to Proposition 2(E) where the cost of investment is low with respect to
its gains, making monopolists and insiders always invest.
12The outsider-problem occurs when it is beneﬁcial for all to merge towards monopoly, but it is even better to
be the outsider in duopoly. This is the situation in Salant et al. [17]. In their model, where there are no scale
economies, merging is beneﬁcial if the number of outsiders is low and the merging ﬁrms represent at least 80% of
the total market. In our three-ﬁrm case this threshold implies the merger towards monopoly.
13T ob ec o m p l e t e ,w eh a v et od i s t i n g u i s ht h r e ed i ﬀerent cases when all managers invest. First, for a high
enough eﬃciency gain (a high enough k), the monopoly naturally arises. For intermediate gains, managers still
prefer to be an outsider over being in a monopoly, but now the other two will prefer to stay together over being
alone. There will be therefore continuously a duopoly, but the formed ﬁrms are not stable. When gains are low,
only the merger towards monopoly is proﬁtable and the reasoning is the same as in the case of no investment.
12 
c 






Figure 3: Stable market structures when 
                there is no internal conflict Proposition 4 When there is internal conﬂict within ﬁrms and investment costs/gains are low
(monopolists and insiders always invest), the monopoly is the only stable structure.
When managers always prefer to invest, entities merge towards monopoly for exactly the
same reasons as when managers always invest in the no-conﬂict situation. These results are
depicted in the lower part of Figure 4 (equivalent to region E of Figure 2).
The case corresponding to Proposition 2(F) is where the conﬂict eﬀect starts interfering
with the scale eﬀect, making the monopoly never investing and there is always an equilibrium
in which insiders invest.
Proposition 5 When there is internal conﬂict within ﬁrms and costs/gains of investment are
intermediate (monopolists never invest and insiders might invest),
(a) If in equilibrium the insiders always invest, the duopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable
industry structure.
(b) If in equilibrium either insiders or the outsider invest, the duopoly is the only stable structure.
Whenever the gains are high, the duopoly in which the insiders invest is the stable industry
structure. The conﬂict eﬀect induces the monopoly not to invest, but it is still not dominating
in the two-player ﬁrm, making the insiders in the duopoly the best oﬀ (See intermediate part
of Figure 4, corresponding to region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). In addition, insiders do not have
incentives to split apart: the gains are high enough to prevent them to deviate to triopoly.
Hence, duopoly is the stable market structure.14 Insiders obtain here a higher proﬁtt h a n
monopolists. This is an important eﬀect that appears with conﬂict. When there is no internal
conﬂict, monopoly is always superior to being an insider in duopoly.
When gains are lower and costs of investment higher, the stability arguments are again the
same as the situation where all managers invest in no-conﬂict (its three cases also appear here,
see footnote 14), but there is an important diﬀerence. Here the monopoly does not invest.
However, even if in this region the monopoly does not invest, the reduction in competition and
14In case (b), the investment Nash equilibrium in duopoly is not unique. There is an equilibrium where only
the insiders invest and a second where only the outsider invests. When two managers deviate, they are optimistic
and expect that in the duopoly structure the Nash equilibrium will be such that they will invest and the outsider
will not. They obtain more under this market structure than under triopoly and hence the triopoly is not stable.
When deviating from monopoly, the outsider being optimistic, assumes that the ﬁnal equilibrium is the one in
which he invests. However, when the outsider invests, the insiders prefer to break up and to deviate towards












Figure 4: Stable market structures when 
               there is internal conflict the lower beneﬁts from investment make the monopoly substantially more beneﬁcial and makes
it the only stable industry structure (See region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). A merger to monopoly
induces here eﬃciency losses.
When costs are high with respect to gains, we are in Proposition 2(G) and 2(H).T h e
conﬂict eﬀect becomes always dominant and neither monopolists nor insiders invest. When
the investment is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal
decision for all managers will be not to invest.
Proposition 6 When there is internal conﬂict within ﬁrms and costs/gains of investment are
high (only single-manager ﬁrms might invest).
(a) If only one triopolist invests, the triopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable industry
structure.
(b) Otherwise, only the monopoly can be a stable industry structure.
When only one triopolist invests and gains from investment are high enough, it is clear that
the triopoly will be the only stable industry structure.15 In the other cases, monopoly is stable
for the same reasons as in region D in Proposition 3.
When managers do not trust each other in a newly merged ﬁrm, they are less willing to
invest, making in turn a merger sometimes unproﬁtable. Thus, internal conﬂict generates less
mergers, resulting in a completely or partly deconcentrated industry structure. This indicates
that even when numerous factors would lead to monopolisation, managers decide not to merge
because of a lack of trust. The monopolisation factors are twofold in our model: possible
economies of scale and having more market power. Mergers however still occur because of the
monopolisation factors, but the lack of trust makes managers often not investing and mergers
lead in this case always to eﬃciency losses.16
In the next section we give, based on our model, a possible explanation for merger failures.
15This triopolist does not want to merge with other managers because of the reinforcing conﬂict and strategic
eﬀects. The other two triopolists do not want to go together either. In a duopoly, the non-investing insiders are
in a disadvantage with respect to the investing outsider and moreover, they have to share proﬁts.
16Our stability concept has an important role in obtaining monopolisation as a stable industry structure. This
equilibrium does not arise in some other merger games. For example, in a model where acquisitions are made
through a bidding game, Kamien and Zang [10] show that monopoly cannot be an equilibrium while making no
acquisition at all always is. This occurs because when deviating, a manager in their model assumes that the
others will not change their strategy, which is possible in our model.
146M e r g e r F a i l u r e s
If managers cannot perfectly foresee whether there will be internal conﬂict within the merged
ﬁrm, it is possible that wrong merger decisions are taken. Suppose that ex-ante managers merge
because they expect a priori that there will be no internal conﬂict, but conﬂict does arise later
on. This misjudgement might lead to a merger failure (less proﬁts in merger than in no-merger).
We have indeed found cases where the monopoly is stable under no conﬂict (Section 5.1) but
where in a conﬂict situation, proﬁts are higher with a lower market concentration (Section 5.2),
meaning that because of not foreseeing this conﬂict, managers have erronously merged.
A similar argument applies when managers are rational but there exists uncertainty about
the possibility of internal conﬂict. Let us assume that ex post -in the investment stage- we are
in one of our two extreme cases (no conﬂict at all or total conﬂict), but ex ante -in the merger
stage- managers cannot perfectly foresee what is going to happen. Thus, managers decide upon
merging given their expectations:
Pr(Conflict)=α
Pr(NoConflict)=1 − α.
Once mergers have occurred, managers realise in which case they are and investment decisions
are as described in Section 4. We omit the derivation of the stable structures, but the procedure
is similar to the two cases presented before.17 The stable market structures are obtained by
calculating with expected proﬁts and are deﬁned by the investment gains (k), investment costs
(c) and expectations (α). For illustrating purposes, we depict in Figure 5 the stability results
for the case k =1 /2.
When managers merge to monopoly because they expect the merger to be proﬁtable because
the risk of internal conﬂict is suﬃciently low, but there arises a conﬂict later, there are cases
where triopoly or duopoly would have been better choices.18
7W e l f a r e
In this section we analyse what would be the socially optimal market structure in each situation
(with and without internal conﬂict) and compare these with the obtained stable outcomes. Total
17Calculations are available upon request.
18The opposite can also be true. If managers have a priori pessimistic expectations about the degree of internal




















Figure 5: Stable market structures when there is 








For the consumers, the best solution is where total industry production is highest. Total
production is increasing in the level of competition and in ﬁrms’ eﬃciency. For both scenarios,
when no ﬁrm or only the triopolists invest and there are therefore no eﬃciency gains in merging,
production is maximised in the triopoly industry structure. When the monopolists invest and
the eﬃciency gains are important, monopoly is optimal for consumers because the eﬃciency
gains outweigh the market power eﬀects. Duopoly can be output maximising, mostly in the
conﬂict case when insiders in duopoly invest, but managers in the monopoly not.
Looking at the producer surplus, if managers cooperate internally the optimum is always
the monopoly. Monopolists are able to replicate or do better what managers do in any other
market structure. For non-cooperating managers, total market concentration may not be proﬁt
enhancing since conﬂict may make it impossible for monopolists to replicate what smaller ﬁrms
do. For example, when the monopolist does not invest but insiders do, it is better to be an
insider than a monopolist: the gains in eﬃciency are higher than the loss of the lower market
power. Figure 6 and 7 present the social optimum for both scenarios. In both cases, when
costs/gains of investment are low consumers and producers interests coincide and the eﬃcent
monopoly is preﬀered. For cost/gains high, it is unlikely that all managers invest and both
groups have opposite interests, but consumer surplus dominates in determining what is best for
total welfare and the triopoly structure maximises total welfare. For intermediate cost/gains
duopoly can be the social optimum.
In comparing the social outcomes (Figures 6 and 7) with the stable industries (Figures 3 and
4), it is clear that when there are important eﬃciency gains in mergers, the stable outcome is
also socially optimal. When the eﬃciencies are less important, stable market structures are not
welfare maximising.
We also see that it is always as good or better for a society when managers cooperate inside
the ﬁrm. This is of course because investment is more often done, leading to more eﬃcient
ﬁrms and thus more production. The non-cooperating managers have sometimes less market
power in a stable structure, a good thing for consumers, but this coincides always with also less
eﬃcient ﬁrms, and the latter eﬀect dominates.
We can derive two main conclusions from the welfare analysis. First, when modelling









Figure 6: Socially optimal market structures           
                when there is no internal conflict  








Figure 7: Socially optimal market structures 
                when there is internal conflict good for the total welfare if the -exogenous- eﬃciency gains are high enough, this is not true
anymore, because often merging managers prefer not to invest, even when they are internally
cooperating. Second, internal conﬂict might not only be bad for the managers, but also for
consumers, because it is leading to less eﬃciency and -oﬀsetting the lower market power eﬀect-
to less production.
8 Discussion
In this section we discuss some assumptions of the model. We constructed a model of endoge-
nous mergers in a concentrated market with only three managers. We believe that the main
eﬀects present would not change in situations with more than three managers. However, with
endogenous investment and our stability concept, this analysis would be extremely complex.
We have chosen for simplicity to present throughout the paper the case where the sharing
rule is exogenous. Our results qualitatively remain unchanged in a model where the managers
optimally decide upon the sharing of the proﬁts when the ﬁrm is formed. Note ﬁr s tt h a ti ts e e m s
natural to assume that when managers are ex ante identical, all the managers in the same ﬁrm
have to receive ex post the same payoﬀ.19 Second, the optimal agreement in the conﬂict case has
to maximise the ﬁrm’s proﬁts taking into account the incentives that this agreement provides.
Hence, whether the managers receive their payoﬀ via a ﬁxed fee and/or as a percentage of the
joint proﬁt determines the incentives to invest. When all the parameter combinations are such
that agreeing on an equal sharing rule of the proﬁts induces the same investment decision as
in the non-conﬂict case, this sharing rule is optimal. When the equal sharing does not give
incentives in a multi-manager ﬁrm, better investment incentives can be obtained by increasing
the percentage of the proﬁts to some managers and compensate the others via a ﬁxed fee. When
managers set up the optimal payment scheme, the diﬀerences between the conﬂict and no conﬂict
case are smaller because in conﬂict the investment levels decrease now more gradually.
We have considered two extreme situations in terms of conﬂict within ﬁrms. Realistically,
there are diﬀerent levels of conﬂict where in the ﬁrm managers may commit on some investments










. Again, while having an additional parameter, the analysis would
yield similar results.
19R a y&V o h r a[ 1 4 ]h a v ei n d e e dp r o v e nt h a ti nas e q u e n t i a lcoalition formation game where players are identical
this is optimal.
17Finally, we have adopted the view that when deviating, managers are optimistic in the sense
that they predict the prevailing equilibrium in investment to be the one in which their proﬁts
are highest. This assumption reduces the set of stable market structures, making in some cases
the set empty. If managers were pessimistic and hence less willing to deviate, while the set of
empty structures may be smaller, we might have situations with multiples t a b l es t r u c t u r e s .
9C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this paper is to broaden the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains
in concentrated markets, including investment as a strategic variable and allowing for a lack of
trust within the ﬁrm. This approach facilitates the understanding of why some mergers may
fail to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen. Other merger models take investment to
be exogenous and treat the ﬁrm as a black box, but as Holmström [9] points out, “we cannot
claim to fully understand either the internal organisation of ﬁrms or the operation in markets
by studying them in isolation”.
We construct an endogenous merger formation model with three managers simultaneously
taking merger decisions. Internal problems may arise on the moment where managers decide
on investing. The lack of trust and inability to identify individual contributions may result in
free-riding problems and suboptimal decisions.
We ﬁnd indeed that even when allowing a merger to be potentially more eﬃcient -i.e., a
larger ﬁrm can produce at a lower cost when having taken the necessary investment decisions-
managers in a merged ﬁrm do not necessarily want this to happen. People in a larger ﬁrm have
eﬀectively more incentives to invest because of economies of scale, but only do so when this is
proﬁtable. The problems due to a lack of trust -becoming bigger in a larger ﬁrm- can even
oﬀset the possible economies of scale thereby making a merged ﬁrm less eﬃcient. In a model
of strategic R&D networks with Cournot competition in later stage, Goyal & Moraga-González
[7] also ﬁnd that when R&D is unilaterally chosen, the level of R&D is decreasing in the size of
the R&D network.
When managers cooperate internally, we ﬁnd a complete market concentration to be the only
stable outcome. Managers can simultaneously decide together and are able to reach what is for
them the best possible industry structure (this is a result similar in the spirit of Salant et al.
[17]). With internal conﬂict, not only monopoly, but only less concentrated market structures
and even a completely defragmentated industry is possible in equilibrium.
18Therefore, when managers in the same ﬁrm trust each other, all merge, but this merged ﬁrm
is not necessarily more eﬃcient than would be a smaller ﬁrm. When managers do not cooperate
internally, they may decide not to merge, because of a too high conﬂict. If they still decide to
merge, they may invest less than the smaller ﬁrms. Whenever a merger is not leading to more
eﬃciency, a move towards more market concentration is leading to lower welfare. Moreover,
the lack of trust seems not only to lead to suboptimal outcomes for the managers, but also from
a social point of view: the consumers loose more from the loss in eﬃciency than they gain due
to a lower market power of the ﬁrms.
With our results, we want to point out that the recent documents on the “eﬃciency defence
of mergers” (see European Commission Report [5]) are forgetting some essential elements. A
regulator should not assume that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger will be realised, which could
change the decision for approval of this merger. Also, although probably not a generalisable
result, the lack of trust in recently merged ﬁrms may be important not only for managers, but
could also be bad for total welfare, indicating that these issues are as well important for policy
makers. Finally, our model also gives an explanation for merger failures. When ﬁrms decide
to go together, the organisational diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If
managers do not correctly foresee internal problems, they merge while this new entity is not
proﬁtable and resulting thus in a failure.
10 Appendix
In this section we present the explicit expressions for the diﬀerent cases in the propositions
and their proofs. The proofs are given following a series of lemmas. We denote for simplicity
Πm
j the (gross) proﬁts for each manager in monopoly when j managers invest; Πi
j,l and Πo
l,j
the (gross) proﬁts for each insider and outsider manager, respectively, when j insiders and l
outsiders invests; and Πt
1,j and Πt
0,j the (gross) proﬁts for each triopolist when he invests and
when he does not, respectively, in the case the other j triopolists invest (j =0 ,1,2). Similarly
we denote πm, πi, πoand πt the ‘net’ proﬁts for each monopolist, insider, outsider and triopolist.
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Within each ﬁr m ,i ti sa l w a y sa l w a y so p t i m a lf o rt h em a n agers to choose a corner solution, where
none of them invests or all of them do. Managers in a monopoly invest if and only if c ≤ cm
where cm is implicitly deﬁned by Πm
3 − cm = Πm
0 . When there is competition, ﬁrms condition
19their investment decisions to those of the rivals. In a duopoly, insiders’ decision depends on the
decision of the outsider and vice versa. The insiders invest if c ≤ ci
1 and if c ≤ ci
0 depending,







Similarly, the outsider invest if c ≤ co
2 and if c ≤ co
0 depending, respectively, whether the insiders






0,0. Finally, each triopolist invests if
c ≤ ct




Lemma 1 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: ct
2 < ct
1 < ct
0 < ci; co < ci; ct
0 < cm and
co < cm where for simplicity we denote ci ≡ ci
0 and co ≡ co
2.






















9 .N o t i c e
that co
0 is not relevant. In the region where the outsider does invest only if the insiders do not
(co
2 <c<co




1 is not relevant because when
the insiders would stop investing if the outsider invested, the latter never invests. Finally, in a
monopoly, cm =
k(2+3k)
4 . The ordering follows from straightforward algebra.
The following Lemma characterizes the four diﬀerent regions in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ min{co,ct
2} all managers in all ﬁrms invest.
b) If min{co,ct
2} <c≤ min{ci,cm}, managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly
invest but single-manager ﬁrms may not.
c) If min{ci,cm} <c≤ max{ci,cm}, either the insiders or the monopolists invest while the
rest never does. If k ≤ 2
5 we have that ci ≤ cm and only the monopolists invest whereas if k>2
5
we have that ci > cm and only the insiders invest.
d) If c>max{ci,cm}, no manager invests.
Proof. a) and d) From Lemma 1, if c ≤ min{co,ct
2} all the cutoﬀs are above and hence all ﬁrms
invest whereas if c>max{ci,cm} all the cutoﬀs are below and hence no manager invests.
b) In this region, by deﬁnition, the insiders and the monopolists invest. Within the region,
as c increases the single-manager ﬁrms stop investing gradually (in diﬀerent order depending on
k).
c) From Lemma 1 the cutoﬀs for all single-manager ﬁrms are below and hence they never
invest. Straightforward algebra shows that when k ≤ 2
5 we have that ci ≤ cm and therefore only
the monopolists invest whereas when k>2
5 then ci > cmand only the insiders invest.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED.
20P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Each manager in a monopoly invests as long as c ≤ e cm
j when j other managers invest (j =0 ,1,2),
where Πm
j+1 − e cm
j = Πm
j . When the outsider invests in the duopoly, each insider invests if
c ≤ e ci




Similarly, when the outsider does not invest, the cutoﬀ points are e ci
j,0 (j =0 ,1)w i t ht h e
analogous deﬁnitions. The cutoﬀ values for the single-manager ﬁr m sa r et h es a m ea si nt h e
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,e co
j = co
j and e ct
j = ct
j.
Lemma 3 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: e ct
2 < e ct
1 < e ct
0 < e co
0; e cm < e ct
1; e cm < e ci
1 <
e ci
0 < e ct
0; e co
2 < e co
0 and e ci
1 < e ct
1 where for simplicity we denote e cm ≡ e cm
2 and e ci
j ≡ e ci
1,j.
Proof. In the monopoly structure, e cm
0 =
k(2+k)
12 , e cm
1 =
k(2+3k)
12 and e cm
2 =
k(2+5k)
12 .W eh a v et h a t
all the managers investing is an equilibrium whenever c ≤ e cm
2 whereas no manager investing is
an equilibrium whenever c>e cm
0 . Between e cm
0 and e cm
2 both equilibrium coexist but the former
is chosen because it Pareto dominates the latter. Then e cm
0 and e cm
1 are not relevant. In the
duopoly structure, the cutoﬀsf o rt h ei n s i d e r sa r ee ci
0,0 =
2k(1+k)
9 , e ci
0,1 = 2k







9 . The same argument as in the monopoly case applies here and only the cutoﬀs
in which the partner invests are relevant. In turn, the relevant cutoﬀs for the outsiders are the
ones in which none or all the insiders invest. The cutoﬀs for the outsider and the triopolists are
obtained in the proof of the previous proposition. Straightforward algebra leads to the ordering.
Lemma 4 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ e cm the managers in the monopoly and the insiders in the duopoly invest.
b) If e cm <c≤ e ci
1 or max{e ci
1,e co
2} <c≤ e ci
0 there is an equilibrium in which the insiders in
the duopoly invest whereas the managers in the monopoly never invest.
c) If e ci
1 <c≤ min{e co
2,e ci
0} and e ci
0 <c≤ e co
0 the insiders and the monopolists never invest and
at least one single-manager ﬁrm invests.
d) If c>e co
0 nobody invests.
Proof. a) We can distinguish two subcases: a.1) When c ≤ min{e cm,e co
2}, from Lemma 3, all the
managers invest because all the cutoﬀs are above. a.2) When e co
2 ≤ c<e cm the outsider does not
invest by deﬁnition and there may be a triopolist that does not invest (when e ct
2 ≤ c<e cm). In
other situations, all managers invest.
21b) Here the monopolists stop investing. Again we can distinguish two subcases: b.1) when
e cm <c≤ e ci
1 the insiders always invest independent of the outsider decision. From Lemma
3, depending on the combination of parameters, the outsider may or may not invest whereas
there are two or three triopolists doing so. b.2) If max{e ci
1,e co
2} <c≤ e ci
0 there are two possible
equilibria in the duopoly: either the insiders do invest and the outsider does not or vice versa.
Again from Lemma 3 we can check that there might be one or two triopolists investing.
c) Here the insiders and the monopolists never invest. We distinguish ﬁve subcases: c.1)
when e ci
1 <c≤ e ct





1} or when max{e co
2,e ci
0} <c≤ e ct
1 two triopolist and the outsider invest, c.3) when
max{e ct
1,e ci
0} <c≤ e ct
0 one triopolist and the outsider invests, c.4) when e ct
0 <c≤ e co
0 only the
outsider invest and c.5) when c>e co
0 no one invests.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
In the following Lemma, we show that in our game we cannot have multiple stable regions when
there is no conﬂict .
Lemma 5 For any combination of parameters, there is at most one stable structure.
Proof. Remember that we denote πm, πi and πo the ‘net’ proﬁts for each monopolist, insider
and outsider (the equilibria in investment are unique). In order to consider all the possible cases
in the triopoly, denote πt
a ≥ πt
b ≥ πt
c the net proﬁts obtained by each triopolist. In what follows
we state the conditions needed to ensure stability. The monopoly is stable when: (1) πm ≥ πi
and (2) if πt
b ≤ πi then πm ≥ πo whereas if πt
b >π i then πm ≥ πt
a (remember that the deviator
is always ”optimistic”). The duopoly is stable when (3) πi >π m or πo >π m and (4) if πt
b ≤ πi
then πi ≥ πo whereas if πt
b >π i then πi ≥ πt
a. The second part of condition (4) is never satisﬁed
(πt
a ≥ πt
b) and hence condition (4) can be rewritten as (4’) both πt
b ≤ πi and πi ≥ πo should
hold. Finally, the triopoly is stable whenever (5) πt
a >π m and (6) πt
b >π i.
We are going to show the result by contradiction. Suppose ﬁrstly that the monopoly and
the duopoly are stable at the same time. From (1) and (3), we get that πo >π m and from (2)
and (4’) that πm ≥ πo and hence a contradiction. Secondly, the duopoly and the triopoly can
not be simultaneously stable structures because (4’) and (6) can not be satisﬁed at the same
time. Finally, suppose that the monopoly and the triopoly are stable structures. From (2) and
(6) we obtain that πm ≥ πt
a which is in contradiction with (5).
22Thanks to the following lemma, we know that the triopoly will never be a stable structure.
Lemma 6 Managers always prefer the monopoly to the triopoly.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrstly that the monopolists do not invest. By Lemma 1 none of the triopolists




0,0 the monopoly is always preferred. Next suppose









1,2. Last, take the case in which a
manager would invest as a monopolist but not as a triopolist. He would prefer a monopoly to
a triopoly in which none of the other triopolists invests when Πm
3 − c>Πt
0,0 or in other words
when c<1+24k+36k2
48 .T h i si sa l w a y st h ec a s ei nt h i sr e g i o ns i n c ec<cm < 1+24k+36k2
48 .W h e n
there are one or two other triopolists investing, the monopoly is even more preferred.
Lemma 7 Managers prefer the monopoly than being insiders in a duopoly.
Proof. First suppose that a given manager invests both in the monopoly and being insider







2,1, the insiders would never deviate






0,1. Third, take the case in which he would invest
in the monopoly but not in the duopoly (from Lemma 1 the outsider does not invest in this
region either). The monopoly is preferred whenever Πm
3 − c>Πi
0,0 or in other words when
c<1+18k+27k2
36 . This is always the case here since c<cm < 1+18k+27k2
36 . Finally suppose that
as an insider he would invest but not as a monopolist (again the outsider does not invest). He
prefers the monopoly as long as Πm
0 > Πi
2,0 −c or c>−1+16k+32k2
36 .S i n c ec>cm > −1+16k+32k2
36
this is always the case in this region.
Lemma 8 The monopoly is the unique stable structure when being in a monopoly is better than
being an outsider (πm ≥ πo) or when insiders in a duopoly would break for triopoly (πt
b >π i).
Otherwise, no industry structure is stable.
Proof. Each one of these conditions, together with Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, ensure that
conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 5 are satisﬁed and hence the monopoly is the
(unique) stable structure. We show the second statement by contradiction. Suppose ﬁrstly that
these conditions are not satisﬁed and that the duopoly is stable. From Lemma 5 the duopoly
could only be stable when the monopoly is not or in other words when πt
b ≤ πi and πo >π m.
F r o mL e m m a7w eh a v et h a tπm >π i and hence πi ≥ πo. This contradicts the condition (4’) in
the proof of Lemma 5. Secondly, from Lemma 6 the triopoly is never stable.
23Lemma 9 When there is no internal conﬂict within ﬁrms, the monopoly is the only stable struc-
ture. No stable structure exists when (c,k) are such that k1 ≤ k<k 2 and c ≤ ct








Proof. We are going to prove this lemma following the four parts identiﬁed in Lemma 2:
a) We have that πt = Πt
1,2 − c>Πi





3 −c ≥ Πo
1,2−c = πo whenever k ≥ k2 = 2
√
3−3
9 . From Lemma 8 the monopoly is stable
if k<k 1 or k ≥ k2 whereas if k1 ≤ k<k 2 no industry structure is stable.
b) We are going to show that at least one of the two conditions in Lemma 8 is satisﬁed. On
the one hand we show that when k ≥ 1
15 we have that πm ≥ πo. If the outsider does invest,
πm = Πm
3 − c ≥ Πo
1,2 − c = πo when k ≥ k2 a n di np a r t i c u l a rw h e nk ≥ 1
15. If the outsider does
not invest, πm = Πm
3 − c ≥ Πo
0,2 = πo when c ≤ −1+34k+11k2
36 .T h i si n e q u a l i t yi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed
when k ≥ 1
15 and c<ci.
On the other hand we show that when k< 1
15 we have that πt
b >π i.T a k e ﬁrst the case
in which no triopolist invests (c>ct
0). We have that πt = Πt
0,0 > Πi
2,0 − c (and in particular
that πt > Πi
2,1 − c) whenever c>−1+64k+128k2
144 . T h i si sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed when k< 1
15 and
c>ct
0. Second consider the case where only one triopolist invests. From the deﬁnition of
the cutoﬀs (see proof of Lemma 1), the outsider always invests in this region when we impose
k< 1
15. In addition, we have that πt
b = Πt
0,1.W eh a v et h a tπt
b = Πt
0,1 > Πi
2,1 − c = πi whenever
c>−1+66k+63k2
144 . T h i si sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed when k< 1
15 and c>ct
1. Last take the case in






2,1 − c = πi whenever k<
√
2−1
6 a n di np a r t i c u l a rw h e nk< 1
15.
c) In the part of this region where only the monopolists invest we have that πt = Πt
0,0 >
Πi
0,0 = πi and hence the monopoly is the stable structure. When the insiders invest, we have
that πt = Πt
0,0 > Πi
2,0 − c = πi whenever c>−1+64k+128k2
144 . This condition is always satisﬁed
since c>cm ≥ −1+64k+128k2
144 .
d) Similar to the ﬁrst part of part c), the monopoly is stable since πt = Πt
0,0 > Πi
0,0 = πi.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
In this and in the following proofs we are going to use, when possible, Lemma 5. In fact, it
applies as long as there is not multiplicity of equilibria in the duopoly investment decisions. As
we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 the region (a) can be divided in two parts.
24a.1) When any manager in any situation invests, the stable structures and the proofs are
identical to those of Proposition 3 when everyone was investing.
a.2) The monopoly is stable because it is preferred to any other position in any other industry
structure. We have that πm = Πm
3 −c>Πi
2,0−c = πi and that πm > Πt
1,1−c>Πt
1,2−c and hence
managers prefer the monopoly to being insiders and being triopolists investing (independent of
being two or three of them doing so). They prefer the monopoly to being outsiders when
πm ≥ Πo
0,2 = πo or when c ≤ −1+34k+11k2
36 and the monopoly to being triopolists not investing
when πm ≥ Πt
0,2 or when c ≤ 1+36k+24k2
48 . These two conditions are always satisﬁed in this region
( e co
2 ≤ c<e cm). Thus, the monopoly is stable and from Lemma 5 it is unique.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 this region can be divided in two parts.
b.1) Here the uniqueness result still applies. Managers prefer being insiders than monopolists
whenever c ≤ c1(k)=−1+12k+18k2
36 : when the outsider invests πi = Πi
2,1 − c>Πm
0 = πm
precisely when c ≤ c1(k) whereas when he does not we have that πi = Πi
2,0 − c>Πm
0 = πm
is always satisﬁed in this region. In addition, πi ≥ πt
b independent of the number of triopolists
investing and of the choice of the outsider. They also prefer to be an insider than an outsider,
πi ≥ πo, independent of the outsider investment decision. This three conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient to ensure duopoly stability (see proof of Lemma 5).
When c>c 1(k),w eh a v et h a tm a n a g e r si nam o n o p o l yd on o ti n v e s tw h e r e a si na n yo t h e r
situation all managers invest (see proof of Lemma 4). Managers prefer the monopoly to being
insiders by deﬁnition. They also prefer the monopoly to the triopoly πm = Πm
0 > Πt
1,2 −
c = πt and hence the triopoly is never stable. Choices between monopoly and outsider and
between insider and triopoly are going to determine three diﬀerent regions. Managers prefer
being monopolists than outsiders whenever c ≥ c2 = 1
36 and they prefer being insiders to
triopolists whenever k ≥ k1 (see proof of Proposition 3). This deﬁnes three regions because: (a)
c0
1(k) > 0 and the k∗ such that c1(k∗)=e ci
1(k∗) is larger than the k∗∗ such that c2 = e ci
1(k∗∗)
and (b) the k∗∗∗ such that c2 = e ci
0(k∗∗∗) is larger than k1.I n t h e ﬁrst region, when k ≤ k1,
the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the second part of (2) are satisﬁed. In the
second region, when k ≥ k1 and c<c 2 no structure is stable. The monopoly is not stable
because condition (2) is not satisﬁed and the duopoly is not stable because managers prefer
being outsiders than insiders (πo >π m ≥ πi) breaking condition (4’). Finally, when c ≥ c2 (and
c>c 1(k)) the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the ﬁrst part of (2) are satisﬁed.
25b.2) There are two diﬀerent equilibria in the duopoly (Lemma 4): either the two insiders
or the outsider invest. The proﬁts in the investing equilibrium are always higher than in the
non-investing one for both the insiders and the outsider (Πi
2,0 − c ≥ Πi
0,1 and Πo
1,0 − c ≥ Πo
0,2).
Denoting the net proﬁts in the insiders-investing equilibrium as πi
d and πo
d a n di nt h eo u t s i d e r -
investing one as πi
e and πo





We restate the stability conditions in order to accommodate this multiplicity. The monopoly
is stable when: (M1) πm ≥ πi
d and (M2) if πt
b ≤ πi
e then πm ≥ πo




a. The insiders-investing duopoly is stable when (M3) πi
d >π m or πo









a. The outsiders-investing duopoly is
stable when (M5) πi
e >π m or πo









a. The second part of condition (M6) is never satisﬁed (πt
a ≥ πt
b) and hence condition




e should hold. Finally, the triopoly is
stable whenever (M7) πt
a >π m and (M8) πt
b >π i
d.




0 = πm whenever c ≤ −1+16k+32k2
36 which is always true in this region. Hence condition (M3)
is satisﬁe d .W ea l s oh a v et h a tπt
b >π i
e independent of having one or two triopolists investing.









whenever c ≤ 1+52k+28k2
144 which is always true when c<e ct
1. Finally, the condition πi
d >π t
a is




1,1 −c in this region (as a triopolist, it is always
better to be investing). The second part of condition (M4) is satisﬁed and hence this structure
is stable.
This is the unique stable structure. The monopoly is not stable because, as we have seen,
πi
d >π m in contradiction with (M1). The outsider-duopoly is not stable either because πt
b >π i
e





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4 this region (c) can be divided in ﬁve parts. Here




0,1). We also have that πt
b >π i everywhere except when there are three
triopolists investing (case c.1) where this is true only when c<c 3(k)=1+34k+k2
144 . Indeed, when




When there are two investing we have that πt
b = Πt
1,1 − c>Πi
0,1 = πi whenever c<1+52k+28k2
144
26which is always the case when c<e ct









On the other hand, we have that πm ≥ πt
a in all cases except when there is only one triopolist
investing where this is true only when c>c 4(k)=−1+18k+27k2
48 . Indeed, when there is only one
triopolist investing this is the condition such that πm = Πm
0 ≥ Πt
1,0 − c = πt
a (we can check





48 a n dt h i si ss a t i s ﬁed when c>e ci
1. Therefore
they also prefer the monopoly to being triopolist when the three invest. When none of the
triopolists invests, clearly πm = Πm
0,0 > Πt
0,0 = πt.
Hence in all region c) except when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) or when
there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k), the monopoly is the unique stable structure.
Conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 5 are satisﬁed.
When there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k) the triopoly is the unique stable struc-
ture. In this region we have seen that πt
a >π m and, as before, πt
b >π i satisfying conditions (5)
and (6).
Finally, when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) there is no stable structure.
We have that πo = Πo
1,0−c>Πm
0 = πm when c<1+10k+7k2
18 and πo = Πo
1,0−c>Πi
0,1 = πi when
c<1+16k+16k2
36 . These two conditions hold when c<e ct
2. Then, since πt
b ≤ πi, the monopoly is
not stable because it would contradict condition (2). The duopoly is not stable either because
πo >π i contradicts condition (4’). Lastly, the triopoly is not stable because we have showed
that πm ≥ πt
a, which is in contradiction with condition (5).
This completes the proof. QED
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